




Epistemological refl ections about the crisis of the DSM-5 and the revolutionary 
potential of the RDoC project
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This paper tests the predictions of an epistemological model that considered the DSM psychiatric classifi cation (in the 
neopositivist and neo-Kraepelinian shape introduced by the DSM-III) as a scientifi c paradigm in crisis. As predicted, 
the DSM-5 did not include revolutionary proposals in its basic structure. In particular, the possibility of a dimensional 
revolution has not occurred and early proposals of etiopathogenic diagnoses were not implemented due to lack of 
specifi c knowledge in that fi eld. However, conceiving the DSM-5 as a bridge between the present phenomenally based 
operational diagnostic criteria and the neuro-cognitively based RDoC criteria introduces an internal tension into the 
system. It is expected that a liberalization of the research criteria will occur, the DSM operational criteria being only 
one possible way to select research subjects.
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INTRODUCTION
The DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2013) has been published in the midst of 
unusual controversy. Criticisms had always 
been advanced, but in the past the DSM system 
was the dominant paradigm and criticisms were 
mainly the unheard complaints of the looser 
schools of thought. Today it’s different, because 
it is the credibility of the DSM itself that is in 
question. For example, Maj (2012, p.161) com-
ments that since the publication of the DSM-IV:
Only a couple of decades have passed, but those al-
ready seem “good old days”. Much of that enthusi-
asm and faith has now vanished […] the questions 
I am now receiving from journalists […] focus not 
so much on “new developments in the manual” 
(the most common question when the DSM-IV was 
launched) as on […] “why we produce this classifi -
cation at all, since we do not have a solid ground on 
which to base it”
It is noteworthy that, today, criticisms come not 
only from external sources (e.g., antipsychiatric 
or psychodynamic thinkers) but from the past-
editors of the DSM itself (e.g. Spitzer, 2008; 
Frances, 2009).
Maybe the main reasons that triggered the 
most vehement polemical reactions were: a) the 
fact that the editors of the DSM-5 frankly admit-
ted that the neo-Kraepelinian project of discov-
ering valid etiologies starting from reliable diag-
noses had failed: “research exclusively focused 
on refi ning DSM-defi ned syndromes may never 
be successful in uncovering their underlying eti-
ologies” (Kupfer et al. 2002, p.xix); and b) their 
proposal to radically reform the DSM-IV struc-
ture: in order to discover etiologies - they say 
- we should discard the usual praxis, and “an as 
yet unknown paradigm shift may need to occur” 
(Kupfer et al., 2002, p.xix).
As a consequence, the debate on the future or-
ganizational structure of the DSM displayed all 
possible positions ranging from two extremes: 
“conservative” and “revolutionary” approaches.
Conservative scholars hold an “epistemic iter-
ation” model, in which “each estimate improves 
on its predecessor so that, with a suffi cient num-
ber of iterations, the process asymptotes to a sta-
ble and accurate  parameter estimate” (Kendler, 
2012, p.305). In this model, 
“Psychiatric nosology is part of a time line. We are 
in the middle of a long historical process. […] We 
should admire our predecessors […] We need to re-
gard our nosologic systems as structures of substan-
tial value to our young fi eld. We should seek to pass 
them on to our successors in yet better shape that we 
found them” (Kendler, 2012, p.320).
However, the basic preconditions are that: a) 
“There needs to be something out there […] to-
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ward which the iteration is aiming” (Kendler, 
2012, p.306), and b) the DSM-III has to have put 
psychiatric nosography “in the right ball-park” 
(Kendler, 2012, p.309).
It seems that there is a crisis of confi dence at 
least about the latter assumption:
“Not surprisingly, as the foundational science that 
ultimately led to DSM-III has approached a half-
century in age, challenges have begun to emerge 
for clinicians and scientists alike that are inherent 
in the DSM structure” (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 2013, p.10), and “The historical aspiration 
of achieving diagnostic homogeneity by progressive 
subtyping within disorder categories no longer is 
sensible” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 
p.12)
Revolutionary proposals are countless and not 
always important: e.g., Frances stresses that:
“Every month or so, someone (usually very smart 
and passionate) sends me a detailed proposal for a 
new diagnostic system offered as an alternative to 
the jumbled, pedestrian, atheoretical, and purely 
descriptive method used in DSM. […] Unfortu-
nately, none of these approaches, however elegant, 
is remotely ready for inclusion in the offi cial system 
of psychiatric nomenclature” (Phillips et al., 2012, 
p.10).
However, it is possible to epistemologically ana-
lyze the general position of putative revolution-
ary systems within a single encompassing model 
inspired by the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962). 
Such a model (Aragona, 2006, 2009a, 2009b) 
was proposed to make understandable the struc-
tural problems that are responsible for many 
“empirical” diffi culties encountered when the 
diagnostic criteria of the DSM-III (and later edi-
tions) have been applied in clinical and research 
settings: internal heterogeneity of the diagnostic 
categories, excessively high rates of comorbid-
ity, lack of prognostic and treatment specifi city, 
questionable validity, and so on. The main thesis 
is  that such “empirical” diffi culties can be better 
understood if they are reconceived as Kuhnian 
“anomalies”, i.e. apparently empirical outputs 
which largely depend on the way the system is 
internally structureda. A defense of some good 
reasons to apply a Kuhnian model to a classifi -
cation system can be found elsewhere (Aragona, 
2009c), as well as a detailed discussion of its 
characteristics, results and limitations (Aragona, 
2006, 2009a, 2009b). For reasons of space, only 
its main assumptions are presented in this paper:
a) the DSM-III represents the birth of a new 
paradigm. This is shown by its effect of restruc-
turing the nosological debate around its own cat-
egories and by its unifying and dominant role in 
the fi eld. Before DSM-III, many classifi cation 
systems were used by different clinicians with 
different theoretical orientation. After the DSM-
III, almost anyone had to uniform clinical, re-
search and teaching activities according to the 
DSM criteria. The introduction of the operation-
al diagnostic criteria has been considered as the 
main reason for such a paradigmatic birth;
b) the DSM paradigm has recently entered a state 
of scientifi c crisis due to internal “anomalies” (in 
Kuhnian terms), i.e., lack of internal homogenei-
ty of the DSM diagnostic categories, excessively 
high rates of comorbidity, and so on;
c) usually a state of scientifi c crisis is resolved 
when the old paradigm is replaced by radical 
theoretical shifts, i.e., when a “scientifi c revolu-
tion” takes place;
d) in order to accomplish a scientifi c revolution, 
the new model must reframe the matter in a way 
that resolves (sometimes vanishes) the basic 
anomalies. This means that a scientifi c crisis of 
the old paradigm is just a necessary but not suf-
fi cient precondition for a scientifi c revolution.
This article analyses the predictions advanced 
by this Kuhnian reformulation of the nosograph-
ic debate in psychiatry. In particular, such pre-
dictions will be contrasted to what actually hap-
pened during the revision process leading to the 
DSM-5. Finally, the revolutionary potential of 
the RDoC project will be explored.
PREDICTIONS ABOUT THE DSM-5
In this section the main predictions of the 
Kuhnian model about the DSM-5 will be dis-
cussed and contrasted to the DSM-5 fi nal output.
1. Changing the general defi nition of “mental 
disorder”
Considering the fl aws of the DSM-IV general 
defi nition of mental disorder, it was considered:
“desirable that DSM-V should, if at all possible, in-
clude a defi nition of mental disorder that can be used 
as a criterion for assessing potential candidates for 
inclusion in the classifi cation, and deletions from it” 
(Rousanville et al., 2002, p.3).
In particular, there was a strong support by many 
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to Wakefi eld’s (1992) “harmful dysfunction” 
defi nition (for a critical analysis see Aragona, 
2009d). Moreover, other proposals were also 
advanced by infl uential experts in conceptual 
issues related to psychiatry (e.g., Stein et al., 
2010).
Prediction. The following picture was envis-
aged:
a) the general defi nition of mental disorder is 
likely to be changed (Aragona, 2006);
b) it is likely that this will be done following 
Wakefi eld’s proposal (Aragona, 2006);
c) in any case, such a change would not modify 
the structure of the system, because it is not re-
vealed by the general defi nition but it is instanti-
ated by the operational diagnostic criteria con-
cretely applied in the individual mental disorders 
(Aragona, 2006; 2009d).
Predictions (a) and (b) were based on the ap-
praisal of the major lines of reasoning that were 
debated at that time (and of their relative force in 
the concrete arena: e.g., personal position of the 
author making a proposal within the DSM com-
mittees, academic sponsors, impact factor and 
visibility of the journals where some ideas were 
published, and so on.).
Prediction (c) was more strictly an epistemo-
logical prediction, that is a prediction result-
ing from an imaginative understanding of what 
would happen at the structural level if some 
parts of the structure would be changed. Episte-
mological predictions of this sort are similar to 
what happens when an engineer changes some 
parts of the model of a building in order to test 
its resilience; the main difference is that episte-
mological predictions are purely logical, while 
the engineers largely use mathematical models.
For reasons of space, in the next paragraphs 
we will not specify which one of these two dif-
ferent kinds of predictions are at play (based on 
the “spirit of the time”, as (a) and (b), or on epis-
temological reasoning, as in (c)). However, we 
are confi dent that the reader will be able to dis-
tinguish them quite easily.
Testing. a) the DSM-5 general defi nition of 
mental disorder slightly changed. In particular, a 
mental disorder is now defi ned as a “syndrome” 
that “refl ects a dysfunction in the psychological, 
biological, or developmental processes underly-
ing mental functioning” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, p.20);
b) Wakefi eld’s idea that at the basis of mental 
disorders there is a dysfunction is substantially 
accepted, but the complementary part of his defi -
nition (i.e., the harmfulness of the conditionb), 
as well as the evolutionary conceptualization of 
the nature of the dysfunction, are not considered;
c) the slight changes of the general defi nition do 
not affect at all the general structure of the DSM, 
whose “core” is still “the operationalized sets of 
diagnostic criteria” (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 2013, p.10).
Overview. The prediction was partially con-
fi rmed. The general defi nition of mental disor-
der was changed but signifi cant components of 
Wakefi eld’s proposal were not included in it. 
The more general prediction that such general 
changes would not have affected the basic struc-
ture of the DSM-5 was confi rmed.
2. Simplifying the operational diagnostic crite-
ria
Considering that the DSM-IV had become too 
complex and that it had become the servant of 
too many different uses (often managed by non-
psychiatrists), one possibility was to simplify the 
operational diagnostic criteria in order to facili-
tate their use by general practitioners and other 
non-medical fi gures working on mental health.
Prediction. “The problem is  that the introduc-
tion of such a simplifi cation into the DSM would 
disrupt it, and this is not possible” (Aragona, 
2006, p.188). Hence, a signifi cant simplifi cation 
of the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 was not 
expected.
Testing. The operational diagnostic criteria were 
not simplifi ed in the DSM-5. Quite the opposite, 
the DSM-5 has been criticized for having made 
them more complex by introducing new sub-
types and specifi ers of severity.
Overview. The prediction was confi rmed.
3. Transcultural issues
It was proposed to put new emphasis on the 
infl uence of cultural issues on the psychiatric 
diagnoses. In particular, any diagnostic revision 
was suggested to follow:
 “two general directions: 1) clear delineation of core 
diagnostic criteria, desirably applicable to all soci-
eties, cultures, and countries throughout the world, 
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and 2) recognition of cultural and cross-cultural 
variants in symptom defi nition and behavioral and 
symptomatic manifestations” (Rousanville et al., 
2002, p.17)
Prediction. “these issues will not lead to con-
crete changes in the DSM-V diagnostic criteria” 
(Aragona, 2006, p.188).
Testing. The DSM-5 puts more emphasis than 
its predecessors on cultural issues, replacing 
the culture-bound syndromes with a glossary of 
cultural concepts of distress and with a cultural 
formulation interview. Three concepts are distin-
guished: the cultural syndrome, the cultural idi-
oms of distress, and the cultural explanation or 
perceived cause of illness experience.
Overview. Such changes are signifi cant and use-
ful. However, the prediction that changes would 
not have directly affected the operational diag-
nostic criteria was confi rmed.
4. Changing the multi-axial system
It was proposed to modify the DSM Axes in 
order to insert in them the emerging genetic, 
pathophysiological, and neurobiological evi-
dence (Gruenberg and Goldstein, 2003).
Prediction. “It is likely that information of this 
kind will be included into the DSM-V […] But 
today it is diffi cult to say which proposals will be 
accepted” (Aragona, 2006, p.189).
Testing. The DSM-5 radically changed the for-
mer multiaxial system, but not in the predicted 
direction of making them increasingly more 
complex by introducing new research evidence. 
On the contrary, the DSM-5 “has moved to a 
nonaxial documentation of diagnosis” (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.16)
Overview. The prediction was not confi rmed. In-
stead of the expected changes, the DSM-5 took 
another, unexpected direction.
5. Adoption of the spectrum model
The suggestion was to replace the “splitting” 
approach of the DSM, which was responsible of 
high comorbidity and inappropriate proliferation 
of diagnostic labels, with a “lumping” approach. 
This should have put together distinct disorders 
in a unique, bigger meta-category, on the basis 
of similarities of various kind (phenomenal, 
epidemiological, etiological, etc.). The result 
should have been the creation of larger spectra 
(e.g., obsessive-compulsive spectrum, bipolar 
spectrum, and so on).
Prediction. a) In many cases the putative simi-
larities are trivial and unspecifi c, while more 
stringent etiological commonalities are not yet 
available. As a consequence, the proposal is 
problematic and unlikely to be realized (Arag-
ona, 2006, p.147); b) If the fi nal result would be 
just that some disorders will change their place, 
from a chapter of the DSM to another one, then 
the proposal is weak because it does not modify 
at all the DSM basic structure (Aragona, 2006, 
p.147).
Testing. a) As expected, a spectrum approach 
was not radically implemented, the DSM-5 men-
tal disorders being based on the same organiza-
tional criteria of previous editions. However, 
there are signifi cant exceptions: e.g., the Autism 
Spectrum Disorder. Whether this represents a 
real improvement over previous classifi cations 
differentiating among several kinds of autistic 
disorders has to be seen. For example, by us-
ing it, the etiologic research will be enhanced 
or hindered (by a concomitant increase of the 
internal heterogeneity of the construct)? In any 
case it is the fi rst time that a real spectrum is 
included in the offi cial diagnostic criteria;
b) The DSM-5 signifi cantly regroups many 
mental disorders. For example, Pica and Ru-
mination Disorder were moved to the chapter 
“Feeding and Eating Disorders”, the Schizotyp-
al (Personality) Disorder is now enlisted also in 
the  chapter “Schizophrenia and Other Psychot-
ic Disorders” (although its diagnostic criteria 
are still to be found in the chapter “Personality 
Disorders”), etc. Such a regrouping promises to 
“enable future research to enhance understand-
ing of disease origins and pathophysiological 
commonalities between disorders” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.12-13). In the 
meanwhile, what is currently available is just a 
change of place, without any signifi cant change 
of the DSM basic categorical structure.
Overview. The kernel of this prediction was 
confi rmed: the spectrum model has not been 
applied consistently, and the change of place of 
some disorders does not infl uence the general 
structure of the DSM. However, what was not 
predicted, and indeed represents a signifi cant 
change, is the creation of an actual spectrum, 
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i.e. the Autism Spectrum Disorder. It might seem 
to be just a little thing but if successful it could 
have relevant consequences for the future.
6. Shifting to a dimensional diagnosis
The creators of the DSM-III were quite sure 
that the enucleated categories represented the 
fi rst step of a scientifi c approach that would have 
ended in the discovery of their underlying etiolo-
gies. However, the editors of the DSM-IV were 
not so certain as before; they envisaged the pos-
sibility of a dimensional shift, although in future 
editions:
“It was suggested that the DSM-IV classifi cation 
be organized following a dimensional model rather 
than the categorical model used in DSM-III-R. A 
dimensional system classifi es clinical presentations 
based on quantifi cation of attributes rather than the 
assignment to categories and works best in describ-
ing phenomena that are distributed continuously and 
that do not have clear boundaries. Although dimen-
sional systems increase reliability and communicate 
more clinical information (because they report clini-
cal attributes that might be subthreshold in a cate-
gorical system), they also have serious limitations 
and thus far have been less useful than categorical 
systems in clinical practice and in stimulating re-
search. […] Nonetheless, it is possible that the in-
creasing research on, and familiarity with, dimen-
sional systems may eventually result in their greater 
acceptance both as a method of conveying clinical 
information and as a research tool” (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1994, p.xxii)
Several indicators were suggesting that a dimen-
sional shift might have occurred in the DSM-5. 
A basic reason was the growing awareness that: 
a) the DSM-IV categories were not clearly dis-
tinct (i.e., the DSM diagnostic criteria were un-
able “to carve the nature at its joints” due to high 
rates of mixed cases and excessive comorbidity);
b) the distinction between Axis I and Axis II, as 
well as the distinction between the cases above 
and below the diagnostic threshold, were blurred;
c) many symptoms were not specifi c of any di-
agnostic category, suggesting that they could be 
considered more usefully as basic traits deserv-
ing to be evaluated in any patient and ranging 
from “normal” low scores to “pathological” 
higher scores.
Various dimensional proposals might be de-
rived from the analysis of these limits of the cat-
egorical diagnosis, including the following three 
(6.1-6.3); the fourth (6.4) is not properly dimen-
sional but is reported because it is relevant for 
future research.
6.1 To radically shift from the categorical sys-
tem (in which the patient either has or has not 
the index disorder) to a dimensional model (any 
patient has his/her own personal profi le resulting 
from the quantitative scoring of X basic dimen-
sions).
Prediction. Despite its usefulness in some re-
spects (e.g., resolution of the comorbidity prob-
lem: Aragona, 2009a), a radical dimensional 
shift also presents many problems. For example, 
it shares with the categorical diagnosis some lim-
its, like the internal heterogeneity affecting both 
categories and dimensions. Most importantly, 
there is no agreement at all on which one among 
many available dimensional systems should be 
used. It was claimed that:
“different alternative proposals being in competi-
tion, they lose their force fi ghting each other, and 
this weakens their revolutionary potential. Hence, 
the dominant categorical system is in crisis but [at 
least for the moment] the revolutionary dimensional 
movement has been warded off” (Aragona, 2006, 
p.173)
Testing. The DSM-5 retains the general categor-
ical structure of previous editions.
6.2 If not a radical shift of the entire system, the 
dimensional diagnosis might at least replace the 
categorical DSM-IV personality disorders. A 
consensus was already reached about the severe 
problems affecting the DSM-IV Axis II: above 
all the extremely high rates of comorbidity be-
tween personality disorders, within and across 
the personality clusters, and the massive use of 
the “not otherwise specifi ed” label.
Prediction. The criticism reported above (6.1) 
was directed not only to a dimentionalization of 
the entire system but also to proposals of dimen-
sinalizing personality traits and diagnoses (as in 
6.2).
Testing. The DSM-5 failed to reshape personal-
ity disorders as dimensional diagnoses:
“Although the benefi ts of a more dimensional ap-
proach to personality disorders have been identifi ed 
in previous editions, the transition from a categori-
cal diagnostic system of individual disorders to one 
based on the relative distribution of personality 
traits has not been widely accepted. In DSM-5, the 
categorical personality disorders are  virtually un-
changed from the previous edition” (American Psy-
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chiatric Association, 2013, p.xliii)
A “hybrid” model and a “dimensional” profi le of 
personality trait expression are included in Sec-
tion III, but only for future research. The offi cial 
diagnosis remains based on categories.
6.3 A third possibility was to integrate within the 
categorical diagnoses a dimensionalization of 
some of their features. In this case the system 
would remain a categorical one, the analysis of 
relevant dimensions being accessory.
Prediction. Such a dimensional integration of 
the categorical diagnosis was considered as a vi-
able option:
“It is already possible to substantially modify the 
DSM through the integration of the categorical and 
dimensional diagnoses, the latter to be used in or-
der to sub-typify the categorical diagnoses. […] 
Researchers will only have to pragmatically choose 
those dimensions carrying the most useful informa-
tion, and to measure whether variations on these di-
mensions infl uence or not the clinical variables. […] 
What is obtained is a sui generis dimensional sub-
typifying […] the fi rst step remains the categorical 
diagnosis, which continues to be the real classifi ca-
tion. By adding dimensional subtypes to the disor-
ders, the aim is to gradually enucleate more homo-
geneous groups” (Aragona, 2006, p.204-206)
Testing. In the DSM-5, dimensional specifi ers 
are provided “to guide clinicians in rating the in-
tensity, frequency, duration, symptom count, or 
other severity indicator of a disorder” (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.22). They 
“provide an opportunity to defi ne a more ho-
mogeneous subgrouping of individuals with the 
disorder who share certain features” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.21-22).
6.4 Finally, the DSM-5 claims that future re-
search will focus on “the underlying dimen-
sional features” of current disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.8), and that the 
DSM-5 itself has already moved in this direction. 
Accordingly, by “reordering and regrouping the 
existing disorders” (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 2013, p.10) the new organizational struc-
ture should “serve as a bridge to new diagnostic 
approaches without disrupting current clinical 
practice or research” (American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 2013, p.13). This is what is called “the 
more dimensional DSM-5 approach” (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.13). Such 
a possibility of a dimensional approach based 
on “underlying features” was not considered as 
dimensional in the Kuhnian-based analysis of 
the psychiatric classifi cation (Aragona, 2006). 
Accordingly, there is neither prediction nor test-
ing of this approach. It has to be noted that here 
“dimensional” refers not to the dimensional di-
agnosis as it was usually debated but to the study 
of transnosographic basic cognitive domains, as 
proposed by the Research Domain Criteria proj-
ect of the American National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH)  (Insel et al., 2010). The DSM-5 
explicitly acknowledges it at pages 8 and 11.
Overview. As predicted, a structural crisis of the 
DSM categorical system is now widely recog-
nized but this had not resulted in a dimension-
al revolution. As expected, this did not happen 
neither in general, nor in the more restricted 
domain of personality. The main reason for this 
unaccomplished revolution is probably the lack 
of agreement on which one, of the several di-
mensional models available, should be adopted.
As suggested, the DSM-5 moved in another, 
less radical but viable direction, that of integrat-
ing dimensional features within the already ex-
isting diagnostic categories.
What was not expected was the last use of the 
term dimension (6.4), to mean those underlying 
cognitive domains whose dysfunction might be 
responsible of the phenomenal picture. More 
than a dimensional approach, this is an “etio-
pathogenic” one, and we will return on it in the 
next session.
7. Shifting to an etiopathogenic classifi cation
As time passed on, many started to believe that 
the problem was not the categorical approach in 
itself, but the very fact that in psychiatry a phe-
nomenal description was not a suitable starting 
point to fi nd etiologies. The perceived risk was 
that of a vicious circle incapable of escaping the 
phenomenal level. The consequent revolution-
ary proposal was not to shift from categories to 
dimensions (both being phenomenally-based) 
but to focus directly on putative etiopathogene-
sis as the starting point of the classifi cation. Here 
the revolution consists in this: while in the neo-
Kraepelinian model the direction was from the 
phenomenal picture to the search of underlying 
etiology, in etiopathogenic approaches the direc-
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tion is from the biological alteration, ahead to 
the resulting behaviors. This could be conceived 
at different levels:
7.1 In the 2002 Research Agenda for the DSM-V 
it was proposed to replace the original DSM-III 
fi ve axes as follows:
“In this system, Axis I would be set aside for re-
cording the patient’s genotype,[…] Axis II could 
be used for recording the patient’s neurobiological 
phenotype, […] The neurobiological phenotype may 
be discerned by neuroimaging, cognitive evaluation, 
and neurophysiological testing. […] Axis III would 
be the behavioral phenotype, which could detail the 
severity and frequency of specifi c cognitive, emo-
tional, and behavioral disturbances […] Axis IV 
would be environmental modifi ers or precipitants 
and would call for the recording of environmental 
factors that may alter the neurobiological and be-
havioral phenotypes. […] Finally, Axis V would be 
devoted to therapeutics” (Charney et al., 2002, p.71)
Prediction. It was stated that such a proposal 
was neither incoherent nor contradictory. How-
ever, it was judged as practically impossible to 
be implemented in today’s psychiatry, due to 
lack of knowledge about the specifi c contents 
requested to fi ll these axes (for example, we do 
not know specifi c genes responsible of psychiat-
ric “behavioral phenotypes”) and also about the 
possible mechanisms linking the different levels 
represented by the fi ve axes. Accordingly, this 
proposal was considered just as a methodologi-
cal exercise, built on the belief and trust that in 
the future we would know what is presently un-
known (Aragona, 2006).
Testing. As expected, the DSM-5 did not re-
shaped its axes etiopathogenically; the model 
remains a neo-Kraepelinian one, based on the 
phenomenal description of mental disorders ful-
fi lling descriptive and neopositivist operational 
diagnostic criteria (see also Aragona, 2013).
7.2 Cognitive researchers and philosophers sug-
gested to ground psychiatric diagnoses neither 
on the micro-level (the genes, as above, or other 
molecular/biochemical features) nor on the mac-
ro-level of behavior and personality. They pro-
posed to focus on an intermediate level, that of 
the cognitive computational modules (Murphy, 
2006, Sirgiovanni, 2009), mental disorders be-
ing conceived as “breakdowns of neurocompu-
tational mechanisms” (Sirgiovanni, 2009, p.47).
The Kuhnian reformulation of the psychiatric 
classifi cation discussed in Aragona (2006) was 
not yet aware of such neuro-cognitive devel-
opments, so no prediction was advanced about 
them. However, Sirgiovanni (2009, p.48) rightly 
stressed that:
“At present such an approach cannot provide a sys-
tematic reformulation of psychiatric taxonomy, but 
it could suggest interesting directions for future psy-
chiatric research”
Accordingly, it can be easily inferred that if 
aware of these models Aragona (2006) would 
have similarly predicted that it was too early 
to include these models in any new psychiatric 
classifi cation.
The same applies to the following more re-
cent case, that of the Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) project. The RDoC project is theoreti-
cally in line with the neuro-cognitive models 
described in this section. However, due to its 
importance in the present debate it will be dis-
cussed apart.
7.3 The DSM-5 use of the term “dimensions” for 
the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project 
risks to be misleading, because as noted above 
(see 6.4) it does not refers to the usual phenom-
enal dimensions derived from psychometric test-
ing.
The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) proj-
ect should be more appropriately conceived as a 
recent development of the neuro-cognitive per-
spective, suggesting:
“to shift researchers away from focusing on the tra-
ditional diagnostic categories as an organizing prin-
ciple for selecting study populations towards a focus 
on dysregulated neurobiological systems” (First, 
2012, p.15)
The main difference from the cognitive models 
discussed above is that the RDoC project is not 
so strictly committed to a massive computation-
al theory of cognitive modules as they are, while 
it retains and probably increases the role of re-
search in neuroscience.
The RDoC proposal is not a diagnosis in its 
classical sense, but a matrix based on basic ar-
eas of psychological (cognitive) functioning to 
be correlated to corresponding brain circuits. As 
such, it has no concrete effects on the DSM-5 
structure (which, as seen, is still the neo-Kraepe-
linian and neopositivist structure introduced by 
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the DSM-III). However, being directly proposed 
by the NIMH and strictly related to the research 
funding dynamics, in the next years it will be-
come a must do for many new research projects. 
The hope is that when enough new fi ndings will 
be available thanks to the RDoC approach, then 
a neuro-cognitive paradigm shift will occur. 
However, despite the RDoC project will sure-
ly increase its relevance in the next years, its 
long-term future is diffi cult to predict. As sug-
gested by Frances, on this respect we need to be 
cautious:
“the obstacles are huge. The complexity of the brain 
has dwarfed the reach of even our most powerful re-
search tools. Our science will advance, but probably 
will uncover vast new territories of our ignorance 
for every new beachhead of new knowledge. It may 
take decades of concerted effort for this project to 
bear clinical fruit and impact on the diagnostic sys-
tem. It is an open question whether NIMH will be 
able to mount the necessary sustained commitment. 
[…] RDoC is indeed our most promising seed - let 
us hope it grows and thrives. But the prospects for 
its future success are unpredictable in these early 
days” (Phillips et al., 2012, p.11)
Overview. As predicted, an etiopathogenic revo-
lution did not occur, and this was basically due 
to signifi cant lack of knowledge, already evident 
years ago. This made impossible to reframe the 
DSM according to an etiopathogenic model. The 
new neuro-cognitive developments seem to be 
more promising, but it is to be seen if they will 
bear concrete fruit.
CONCLUSIONS
In this era of scientifi c crisis of psychiatric 
classifi cation, possible alternatives range be-
tween two extremes. At one side there are rev-
olutionary systems suggesting that the current 
system should be totally dismissed and substi-
tuted by some new, “incommensurable” sys-
tem. On the other side there are “conservative” 
scholars who easily show that the state of our 
knowledge is not ready to include such propos-
als, and that a conservative approach has to be 
preferred to avoid to throw out the baby with the 
bath water. Two by-products of this opposition 
are that: a) those talking about paradigm shift 
and scientifi c revolutions risk to be seen as un-
reliable dreamers, while b) the rejection of the 
revolutionary proposals gives the (false) impres-
sion that the current system is the right one and 
that we should simply refi ne it.
The epistemological model discussed in the 
present article:
a) suggested a scientifi c crisis of the current 
paradigm and gave the epistemological tools to 
analyze alternative proposals (Aragona, 2006, 
2009a);
b) discussed the reasons for predicting that de-
spite its status of crisis the DSM-5 would have 
not included revolutionary proposals in its struc-
ture (Aragona, 2006);
c) tested such predictions by contrasting them 
with the concrete structure of the DSM-5 (this 
paper).
As such, it differs from the above reported op-
posing models because while it talks of a para-
digmatic crisis, it is not the partisan of the new at 
any cost. On the contrary, it is cautious concern-
ing the usefulness and viability of the claimed 
revolutions, and in this it supports those conser-
vative views stating that the DSM is not ready 
to radically change. However, it also contests 
the idea that from the fact that the revolutionary 
models are unready to change the paradigm, we 
should conclude that the DSM is “in the right 
ball-park”. The DSM is in crisis due to its inter-
nal weakness, and the lack of valuable and ready 
alternatives does not change anything on this re-
spect.
The emerging picture is that, as expected, the 
DSM-5 is a rather conservative system because 
its “core” remains the extensive use of neoposi-
tivist operational criteria to categorize mental 
disorders. The basic anomalies of the system be-
ing unresolved, the DSM still remains a system 
in scientifi c crisis waiting for a revolutionary so-
lution.
What was not predictable years ago is that 
the NIMH would have decided to abandon the 
neo-Kraepelinian project subtending the DSM-
III and to replace it with a revolutionary etio-
pathogenic approach, i.e. the RDoC project. The 
DSM-5 tries to consider both views in proposing 
itself as a “bridge”. However, and this is the pre-
diction for the next years, in doing so the DSM-5 
introduces in itself a tension which is probably a 
weak spot, because the two views are opposite 
and incompatible. It is likely that in the follow-
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ing years clinicians and researchers will be re-
quested to continue to use the DSM diagnoses to 
communicate, while they will be more free than 
today to use other ways of assessment for more 
defi ned needs.
In this context, and considering their expected 
effect on research funding, the RDoC defi nitions 
are likely to be widely adopted from an increas-
ing number of research centers. If this is the pre-
lude for a revolution is too early to say; in the 
history of psychiatry it happened many times 
that a strong confi dence on the power of experi-
mental results turned out to be a disappointment.
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Endnotes
a: Here the term structure refers to the general taxonomic 
features that were selected to apply to the DSM men-
tal disorders and thus characterize them: e.g., diagnoses 
grounded on the phenomenal level, categorical approach, 
use of polythetic operational criteria, splitting approach, 
and so on.
b: The DSM-IV stressed the harmful part of the concept by 
considering present distress or disability, or an increased 
risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss 
of freedom, as necessary conditions (as something that “is 
associated” with the clinically signifi cant syndrome or 
pattern: American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p.xxi). 
On the contrary, the DSM-5 reduces the importance of 
harmfulness by considering distress or disability as condi-
tions “usually associated” (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2013, p.20).
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